Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment

By John Pittard

Oxford University Press, 2019

ISBN-13: 978-0190051839

The striking extent of religious disagreement suggests that religious conviction is often the result of processes that do not reliably produce true beliefs. Many argue that this implies a rational response should be religious skepticism, eschewing confident religious belief in light of epistemic worries posed by such disagreements. However, John Pittard contests this skeptical conclusion, explaining how it can still be rational to maintain confident belief despite these challenges.

Pittard argues against the commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality that underpins disagreement-motivated skepticism. He critiques approaches that allow unproblematic privileging of one’s first-person perspective while emphasizing the importance of having rational insight into reasons favoring one’s outlook. Yet, he challenges narrowly intellectualist accounts of such insights, contending that many crucial rational insights are not achievable through analytical reasoning but come from relevant emotional experiences.

In the second part of the book, Pittard explores the implications of accepting the impartiality requirement favored by “disagreement skeptics” for religious commitment. He challenges the assumption that rigorous epistemic impartiality would rule out confident religious belief. However, he argues such an impartiality commitment might make it irrational to pursue one’s preferred form of religious life and could prevent rational engagement in any religious or irreligious way of life.

This troubling conclusion provides a reason to hope that the arguments against impartiality are correct, allowing for justification of conviction despite widespread disagreement.